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Abstract
We consider iterative voting models and position them within the general framework of acyclic games and
game forms. More specifically, we classify convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent
scheduler (the order of players) and the action scheduler (which better-reply is played).
Our main technical result is providing a complete picture of conditions for acyclicity in several variations
of Plurality voting. In particular, we show that (a) under the traditional lexicographic tie-breaking, the game
converges for any order of players under a weak restriction on voters’ actions; and (b) Plurality with randomized
tie-breaking is not guaranteed to converge under arbitrary agent schedulers, but from any initial state there is
some path of better-replies to a Nash equilibrium. We thus show a first separation between restricted-acyclicity
and weak-acyclicity of game forms, thereby settling an open question from [Kukushkin, 2011]. In addition, we
refute another conjecture regarding strongly-acyclic voting rules.
1 Introduction
Researchers in economics and game theory since Cournot [1838] had been developing a formal framework to study
questions about acyclicity and convergence of local improvement dynamics in games.
Intuitively put, strong-acyclicity means that the game will converge regardless of the order of players/voters
and how they select their action (as long as the moving agents are improving their utility in every step), i.e. that
there are no cycles of better-replies whatsoever; Weak-acyclicity means that while cycles may occur, from any
initial state (voting profile) there is at least one path of better-replies that leads to a Nash equilibrium; Restricted-
acyclicity is a middle ground, requiring convergence for any order of players (agent scheduler), but allowing the
action scheduler to restrict the way they choose among several available replies (e.g., only allowing best-replies).
Most relevant to us is the work of Kukushkin [1999; 2002; 2011], who studied general characterizations of game
forms that guarantee various notions of acyclicity.
A more recent field is iterative voting. In the iterative voting model, voters have fixed preferences and start
from some announcement (e.g., sincerely report their preferences). Votes are aggregated via some predefined rule
(e.g. Plurality), but can change their votes after observing the current announcements and outcome. The game
proceeds in turns, where a single voter changes his vote at each turn, until no voter has objections and the final
outcome is announced. This process is similar to online polls via Doodle or Facebook, where users can log-in at
any time and change their vote. Similarly, in offline committees the participants can sometimes ask to change their
vote, seeing the current outcome.
The formal study of iterative voting rules was initiated about 6 years ago in a AAAI paper that was a pre-
liminary version of this one [Meir et al., 2010]. Iterative voting papers typically focus on common voting rules
∗A preliminary version of this paper has been presented at AAAI-2010 [Meir et al., 2010].
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such as Plurality and Borda, and study the conditions under which convergence of the iterative process to a Nash
equilibrium is guaranteed. Most results in the field consider best-reply dynamics [Lev and Rosenschein, 2012;
Reyhani and Wilson, 2012; Obraztsova et al., 2015].
While voting rules and game forms are essentially the same thing, the iterative voting literature has remained
largely detached from the more general literature on acyclicity in games. Bridging this gap is the main conceptual
contribution of this work, for two reasons. First, understanding the conditions that entail acyclicity of games and
game forms is crucial to the understanding of iterative voting scenarios, and to properly compare convergence
results (e.g. convergence of best-reply dynamics is a special case of restricted acyclicity). Likewise, convergence
results for specific voting rules under best/better-reply dynamics may shed light on more general questions re-
garding acyclicity. Building on the formalism of Kukushkin [2011] for strong/ restricted/ weak-acyclicity of game
forms, we re-interpret in this paper both known and new results on convergence of better- and best-reply in voting
games, and answer some open questions.
1.1 Related work
Kukushkin [2011] provided several partial characterizations for game forms with strong acyclicity. In particular, he
showed that if we further strengthen the acyclicity requirement to demand an ordinal potential, then this is attained
if and only if the game form is dictatorial, i.e., there is at most one voter that can affect the outcome. He further
characterized game forms that are strongly acyclic under coalitional improvements, and provided broad classes
of game forms that are “almost unrestricted acyclic,” i.e. restricted-acyclic under mild restrictions on voters’
actions. Other partial characterizations have been provided for acyclicity in complete information extensive-form
games [Boros et al., 2008; Andersson et al., 2010]. Some of this work is explained in more detail in the following
sections.
The study of classes of games (i.e. game forms with utilities) that are guaranteed to be acyclic or weakly acyclic
attracted much attention, in particular regarding the existence and properties of potential functions [Monderer and Shapley,
1996; Milchtaich, 1996; Fabrikant et al., 2010; Apt and Simon, 2012].
Strategic voting The notion of strategic voting has been highlighted in research on Social Choice as crucial to
understanding the relationship between preferences of a population and the final outcome of elections. In various
applications (ranging from political domains to artificial intelligence [AI]), the most widely used voting rule is
Plurality, in which each voter has one vote and the winner is the candidate who received the highest number of
votes. While it is known that no reasonable voting rule is completely immune to strategic behavior [Gibbard,
1973; Satterthwaite, 1975], Plurality has been shown to be particularly susceptible, both in theory [Saari, 1990;
Friedgut et al., 2011] and in practice [Forsythe et al., 1996]. This makes the analysis of any election campaign—
even one where the simple Plurality rule is used—a challenging task. As voters may speculate and counter-
speculate, it would be beneficial to have formal tools that would help us understand (and perhaps predict) the final
outcome.
In particular, natural tools for this task include the well-studied solution concepts developed for normal form
games, such as better/best responses, dominant strategies or different variants of equilibrium. Now, while vot-
ing settings are not commonly presented in this way, several natural formulations have been proposed in the
past [Dhillon and Lockwood, 2004; Chopra et al., 2004; Sertel and Sanver, 2004; Falik et al., 2012; Messner and Polborn,
2002]. These formulations are extremely simple for Plurality voting games, where voters have only a few available
ways to vote. Specifically, some of this previous work has been devoted to the analysis of solution concepts such
as elimination of dominated strategies [Dhillon and Lockwood, 2004] and strong equilibria [Sertel and Sanver,
2004]. There has been other multi-step voting procedures that have been proposed in the literature, such as iterated
majority vote [Airiau and Endriss, 2009] and extensive form games where voters vote one by one [Desmedt and Elkind,
2010]. In contrast to iterative voting, these models are inconsistent with the better-reply dynamics in normal
form games, and are analyzed via different techniques. A model more similar to ours was recently studied in
[Elkind et al., 2015], where voters can choose between voting truthfully, and manipulating under the assumption
that everyone else are truthful.
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Convergence of better-reply dynamics in iterative voting for particular voting rules has been studied extensively
in the computational social choice literature. We summarize and compare these findings with ours in the concluding
section, and in particular in Table 1.
An important question in every model of strategic voting, including iterative voting, is whether the reached
equilibrium is good for the society according to various metrics. Branzei et al.[2013] showed bounds on the
dynamic price of anarchy, i.e. how far can the final outcome be from the initial truthful outcome. Other work used
simulations to show that iterative voting may improve the social welfare or Condorcet efficiency [Grandi et al.,
2013; Meir et al., 2014; Koolyk et al., 2016], but typically under the assumptions that voters use various heuristics.
Biased and sophisticated voting Some recent work on iterative voting deals with voters who are uncertain, truth-
biased, lazy-biased, bounded-rational, non-myopic, or apply some other restrictions and/or heuristics that diverge
from the standard notion of better-reply in games [Reijngoud and Endriss, 2012; Gohar, 2012; Grandi et al., 2013;
Obraztsova et al., 2013; Meir et al., 2014; Rabinovich et al., 2015; Obraztsova et al., 2015; Meir, 2015]. Although
the framework is suitable for studying such iterative dynamics as well, this paper deals exclusively with myopic
better-reply dynamics.1
1.2 Contribution and structure
The paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we define the iterative voting model within the more general framework
of game forms and acyclicity properties. In Section 3 we consider strong acyclicity, and settle an open question
regarding the existence of acyclic non-separable game forms. Section 4 focuses on order-free acyclicity of the
Plurality rule. Our main result in this section shows that to guarantee convergence, it is necessary and sufficient
that voters restrict their actions in a natural way that we term direct reply—meaning that a voter will only reassign
his vote to a candidate that will become a winner as a result. In Section 5, we use variations of Plurality to show
a strict separation between restricted acyclicity and weak acyclicity, thereby settling another open question. We
conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
We usually denote sets by uppercase letters (e.g., A,B, . . .), and vectors by bold letters (e.g., a = (a1, . . . , an)).
2.1 Voting rules and game forms
There is a set C of m alternatives (or candidates), and a set N of n strategic agents, or voters. A game form (also
called a voting rule) f allows each agent i ∈ N to select an action ai from a set of messages Ai. Thus the input to
f is a vector a = (a1, . . . , an) called an action profile. We also refer to ai as the vote of agent i in profile a. Then,
f chooses a winning alternative—i.e., it is a function f : A → C, where A = ×i∈NAi. See Fig. 1 for examples.
A voting rule f is standard if Ai = A for all i, and A is either pi(C) (the set of permutations over C)
or a coarsening of pi(C). Thus most common voting rules except Approval are standard. Mixed strategies are
not allowed. The definitions in this section apply to all voting rules unless stated otherwise. For a permutation
P ∈ pi(C), We denote by top(P ) the first element in P .
Plurality In the Plurality voting rule we have that A = C, and the winner is the candidate with the most votes.
We allow for a broader set of “Plurality game forms” by considering both weighted and fixed voters, and varying
the tie-breaking method. Each of the strategic voters i ∈ N has an integer weight wi ∈ N. In addition, there are nˆ
“fixed voters” who do not play strategically or change their vote. The vector sˆ ∈ Nm (called “initial score vector”)
specifies the number of fixed votes for each candidate. Weights and initial scores are part of the game form.2
1We do consider however two standard ways to handle ties that slightly relax the better-reply definition. See Section 4.4.
2All of our results still hold if there are no fixed voters, but allowing fixed voters enables the introduction of simpler examples, and facilitates
some of the proofs, see Remark 4.1. For further discussion on fixed voters see [Elkind et al., 2015].
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f1 a b c
a a a a
b b b b
c c c c
f2 a b c
a a a a
b a b b
c a b c
f3 x y
a a b
b b c
c c a
f4 x y z w
a ax ay az aw
b bx by bz bw
c cx cy cz cw
Figure 1: Four examples of game forms with two agents. f1 is a dictatorial game form with 3 candidates (the row
agent is the dictator). f2 is the Plurality voting rule with 3 candidates and lexicographic tie-breaking. f3 and f4
are non-standard game forms. In f3, A1 = C = {a, b, c}, A2 = {x, y}. Note that f4 is completely general (there
are 3× 4 possible outcomes in C, one for each voting profile) and can represent any 3-by-4 game.
fPL
w,sˆ a b c
a (14, 9, 3) {a} (10, 13, 3) {b} (10, 9, 7) {a}
b (11, 12, 3) {b} (7, 16, 3) {b} (7, 12, 7) {b}
c (11, 9, 6) {a} (7, 13, 6) {b} (7, 9, 10) {c}
Figure 2: A game form fPL
w,sˆ, where N = {1, 2}, A1 = A2 = C = {a, b, c}, sˆ = (7, 9, 3) and w = (3, 4) (i.e.,
voter 1 has weight 3 and voter 2 has weight 4). The table shows the final score vector s(a1,a2) for every joint action
of the two voters, and the respective winning candidate fPL
w,sˆ(a1, a2) in curly brackets.
The final score of c for a given profile a ∈ An in the Plurality game form fw,sˆ is the total weight of voters that
vote c. We denote the final score vector by ssˆ,w,a (often just sa or s when the other parameters are clear from the
context), where s(c) = sˆ(c) +∑i∈N :ai=c wi.
Thus the Plurality rule selects some candidate from W = argmaxc∈C ssˆ,w,a(c), breaking ties according to
some specified method. The two primary variations we consider are fPL
sˆ,w which breaks ties lexicographically, and
fPR
sˆ,w which selects a winner from W uniformly at random. As with s, we omit the scripts w and sˆ when they are
clear from the context.
For illustration, consider an example in Fig. 2, demonstrating a specific weighted Plurality game form with two
agents.
2.2 Incentives
Games are attained by adding either cardinal or ordinal utility to a game form. The linear order relationQi ∈ pi(C)
reflects the preferences of agent i. That is, i prefers c over c′ (denoted c ≻i c′) if (c, c′) ∈ Qi. The vector containing
the preferences of all n agents is called a preference profile, and is denoted by Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn). The game form
f , coupled with a preference profile Q, defines an ordinal utility normal form game G = 〈f,Q〉 with n agents,
where agent i prefers outcome f(a) over outcome f(a′) if f(a) ≻i f(a′). In standard game forms the action ai
may indicate the agent’s preferences, hence their common identification with voting rules.
Improvement steps and equilibria Having defined a normal form game, we can now apply standard solution
concepts. Let G = 〈f,Q〉 be a game, and let a = (a−i, ai) be a joint action in G.
We denote by a i→ a′ an individual improvement step, if (1) a, a′ differ only by the action of player i; and (2)
f(a−i, a
′
i) ≻i f(a−i, ai). We sometimes omit the actions of the other voters a−i when they are clear from the
context, only writing ai
i
→ a′i. We denote by Ii(a) ⊆ Ai the set of actions a′i s.t. ai
i
→ a′i is an improvement
step of agent i in a, and I(a) =
⋃
i∈N
⋃
a′
i
∈Ii(a)
(a−i, a
′
i). a
i
→ a′i is called a best reply if a′i is i’s most preferred
candidate in Ii(a).
A joint action a is a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) in G if I(a) = ∅. That is, no agent can gain by changing
his vote, provided that others keep their strategies unchanged. A priori, a game with pure strategies does not have
to admit any NE.
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〈
f,Q1
〉
a b * c
* a {a} 3,2 {b} 2, 1 * {a} 3,2
b {b} 2, 1 {b} 2,1 {b} 2, 1
c {a} 3, 2 {b} 2, 1 {c} 1, 3
Figure 3: A game G =
〈
f,Q1
〉
, where f = fPL
w,sˆ is as in Fig. 2, and Q1 is defined by a ≻1 b ≻1 c and
c ≻2 a ≻2 b. The table shows the ordinal utility of the outcome to each agent, where 3 means the best candidate.
Bold outcomes are the NE points. Here the truthful vote (marked with *) is also a NE.
〈
f,Q2
〉
a b * c
* a {a} 3, 1 {b} 1,2 * {a} 3, 1
b {b} 1, 2 {b} 1,2 {b} 1, 2
c {a} 3, 1 {b} 1, 2 {c} 2, 3
Figure 4: This game has the same game form as in Fig. 2, and the preference profile Q2 is a ≻1 c ≻1 b and
c ≻2 b ≻2 a. In this case, the truthful vote a∗(Q2) is not a NE.
Now, observe that when f is a standard voting rule the preference profile Q induces a special joint action
a∗ = a∗(Q), termed the truthful state, where a∗i equals (the coarsening of) Qi. E.g. in Plurality a∗i = top(Qi).
We refer to f(a∗) as the truthful outcome of the game 〈f,Q〉.
The truthful state may or may not be included in the NE points of the game, as can be seen from Tables 3 and 4
that demonstrate games that are induced by adding incentives to the game form shown in Fig. 2, and indicate the
truthful states and the NE points in these games.
2.3 Iterative Games
We consider natural dynamics in iterative games. Assume that agents start by announcing some initial profile a0,
and then proceed as follows: at each step t a single agent i may change his vote to a′i ∈ Ii(at−1), resulting in a
new state (joint action) at = (at−1−i , a′i). The process ends when no agent has objections, and the outcome is set by
the last state.
Local improvement graphs and schedulers Any gameG induces a directed graph whose vertices are all action
profiles (states)A, and edges are all local improvement steps [Young, 1993; Andersson et al., 2010]. The pure Nash
equilibria of G are all states with no outgoing edges. Since a state may have multiple outgoing edges (|I(a)| > 1),
we need to specify which one is selected in a given play.
A scheduler φ selects which edge is followed at state a at any step of the game [Apt and Simon, 2012]. The
scheduler can be decomposed into two parts, namely selecting an agent i to play (agent scheduler φN ), and se-
lecting an action in Ii(a) (action scheduler φA), where φ = (φN , φA). We note that a scheduler may or may not
depend on the history or other factors, but this does not affect any of our results.
Convergence and acyclicity Given a game G, an initial action profile a0 and a scheduler φ, we get a unique
(possibly infinite) path of steps.3 Also, it is immediate to see that the path is finite if and only if it reaches a Nash
equilibrium (which is the last state in the path). We say that the triple 〈G, a0, φ〉 converges if the induced path is
finite.
Following [Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Milchtaich, 1996], a game G has the finite individual improvement
property (we say that G is FIP), if 〈G, a0, φ〉 converges for any a0 and scheduler φ. Games that are FIP are also
known as acyclic games and as generalized ordinal potential games [Monderer and Shapley, 1996].
It is quite easy to see that not all Plurality games are FIP (see examples in Section 4). However, there are
alternative, weaker notions of acyclicity and convergence.
3By “step” we mean an individual improvement step, unless specified otherwise.
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• A gameG is weakly-FIP if there is some scheduler φ such that
〈
G, a0, φ
〉
converges for any a0. Such games
are known as weakly acyclic, or as φ-potential games [Apt and Simon, 2012].
• A game G is restricted-FIP if there is some action scheduler φA such that
〈
G, a0, (φN , φA)
〉
converges for
any a0 and φN [Kukushkin, 2011]. We term such games as order-free acyclic.
Intuitively, restricted FIP means that there is some restriction players can adopt s.t. convergence is guaranteed re-
gardless of the order in which they play. Kukushkin identifies a particular restriction of interest, namely restriction
to best-reply improvements, and defines the finite best-reply property (FBRP) and its weak and restricted analogs.
We emphasize that an action scheduler must select an action in Ii(a), if one exists. Thus restricted dynamics that
may disallow all available actions (as in [Gohar, 2012; Grandi et al., 2013]) do not fall under the definition of
restricted-FIP (but can be considered as separate dynamics).
We identify a different restriction, namely direct reply, that is well defined under the Plurality rule. For-
mally, a step a i→ a′ is a direct reply if f(a′) = a′i, i.e., if i votes for the new winner (see labeled examples
in Section 4). Another rule where a natural direct reply exists is Veto, where a voter can veto the current win-
ner [Lev and Rosenschein, 2012].
φA is direct if it always selects a direct reply. We get the following definitions for a Plurality game G, where
FDRP stands for finite direct reply property:
• G is FDRP if
〈
G, a0, φ
〉
converges for any a0 and any direct φ.
• G is weakly-FDRP if there is a direct φ such that
〈
G, a0, φ
〉
converges for any a0.
• G is restricted-FDRP if there is a direct φA such that
〈
G, a0, (φN , φA)
〉
converges for any a0 and φN .
• FDBRP means that replies are both best and direct. Note that it is unique and thus cannot be further restricted.
Finally, a game form f has the X property (where X is any of the above versions of finite improvement) if 〈f,Q〉
is X for all preference profiles Q ∈ (pi(C))n. We have the following entailments, both for games and for game
forms. The third row is only relevant for Plurality/Veto.
FBRP restricted-FBRP ⇒ weak-FBRP
⇑ ⇓ ⇓
ordinal potential ⇒ FIP ⇛ FDBRP ⇛ restricted-FIP ⇒ weak-FIP ⇒ pure Nash
exists ⇓ ⇑ ⇑ exists
FDRP restricted-FDRP ⇒ weak-FDRP
Kukushkin notes that there are no known examples of game forms that are weak-FIP, but not restricted-FIP. We
settle this question later in Section 5.2.
Convergence from the truth We say that a game G is FIP from state a if 〈G, a, φ〉 converges for any φ. Clearly
a game is FIP iff it is FIP from a for any a ∈ An. The definitions for other all other notions of finite improvement
properties are analogous.
We are particularly interested in convergence from the truthful state a∗. This is since: a. it is rather plausible to
assume that agents will start by voting truthfully, especially when not sure about others’ preferences; and b. even
with complete information, they may be inclined to start truthfully, as they can always later change their vote.
Heuristic voting Much work on iterative voting deals with heuristics, rather than best- or better-replies. Strong,
Restricted, and Weak convergence properties can be defined the same way, where the only difference is the
way we define Ii(a) (i.e., all steps that are allowed for agent i at state a by the considered heuristics). For
example, truth-bias assumes that if a voter does not have any local improvement step, she reverts to her truth-
ful vote [Obraztsova et al., 2013]. Some heuristics are already restricted to a single action (for example, “k-
pragmatist” [Grandi et al., 2013]). In these cases the only meaningful distinction is between FIP and weak-FIP. In
this paper we do not consider heuristic voting.
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3 Strong Acyclicity
An ordinal potential is a function that strictly increases if and only if some agent plays a better-reply [Monderer and Shapley,
1996]. A generalized ordinal potential is a function that strictly increases with every better-reply, but may also
increase with other steps. Clearly, a game is FIP if and only if it has a generalized potential (by a topological sort
of the better-reply graph).
Theorem 1 (Kukushkin [2011]). A game form f guarantees an ordinal potential (i.e. every derived game has an
ordinal potential function) if and only if f is a dictatorship.
We emphasize that this result does not preclude the existence of other game forms with FIP (generalized ordinal
potential). Indeed, Kukushkin provides a partial characterization of FIP game forms. For example, a rule where
there is a linear order L over C, and the winner is the first candidate according to L that is top-ranked by at least
one voter.
A game form f is called “separable” [Kukushkin, 2011] if there are mappings gi : Ai → C for i ∈ N s.t. for
all a ∈ A, f(a) ∈ {g1(a1), g2(a2), . . . , gn(an)}. That is, the vote of each voter is mapped to a single candidate
via some function gi, and the outcome is always one of the candidates in the range. Examples of separable rules
include Plurality and dictatorial rules, in both of which gi are the identity functions.
Conjecture 2 (Kukushkin [2011]). Any FIP game form is separable.
Some weaker variations of this conjecture have been proved. In particular, for game forms with finite coali-
tional improvement property [Kukushkin, 2011], and for FIP game forms with n = 2 voters [Boros et al., 2010]
(separable game forms are called “assignable” there). We next show that for sufficiently large n, there are non-
separable FIP game forms, thereby refuting the conjecture. Our proof uses the probabilistic method: we sample a
game form from some space, and prove that with positive probability it must be non-separable and FIP.
Theorem 3. For any n ≥ 20, there is a non-separable game form fn s.t. fn is FIP.
Proof. LetC = {a1, . . . , a2n}∪{z}. LetAi = {x, y} for each voter. Thus fn is a function from the n dimensional
binary cube B = {x, y}n to C. We select 2n profiles a1, . . . , a2n uniformly at random, i.i.d. from B (allowing
repetitions), and define fn(aj) = aj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}. For all other 2n − 2n profiles we define fn(a) = z.
For any two profiles a, a′, let d(a, a′) be the number of voters that disagree in a, a′ (the Manhattan distance
on the cube). Let B ⊆ B be all 2n profiles whose outcome is not z. For j, j′ ≤ 2n, denote by pj,j′ the probability
that d(aj , aj′) ≤ 2, and by Xj,j′ the corresponding indicator random variable. Since both of aj , aj
′
were sampled
uniformly i.i.d., and there are less than n2 profiles within distance 2 from aj , we get that pj,j′ ≤ n
2
2n .
Next, by the union bound,
Pr(∃Xj,j′ = 1) ≤
∑
j≤2n,j′≤2n
Pr(Xj,j′ ) =
∑
j≤2n,j′≤2n
pj,j′ ≤ (2n)
2n
2
2n
=
4n2
2n
,
which is strictly less than 1 for n ≥ 20. Thus w.p. > 0 we get Xj,j′ = 0 for all j, j′. In particular there is at least
one such game form f∗n where Xj,j′ = 0 for all j, j′. We argue that f∗n is both FIP and non-separable.4
Assume towards a contradiction that there is some cycle of better-replies in f∗n. Then there must be a path
containing at least 3 distinct outcomes, and thus at least 2 profiles from B. Denote these profiles by a,b. Since
Xj,j′ = 0 for all j, j′, we have that any path between a and b is of length at least 3, and that the path must contain
at least two consequent states whose outcome is z. This path cannot be a better-reply path, since a better reply
must change the outcome. Hence we get a contradiction and f∗n is FIP.
Finally, note that since Xj,j′ = 0 for all j, j′, in particular aj are all distinct profiles, and thus f∗n has 2n+1 >∑
i≤n |Ai| possible outcomes. In contrast, for any separable rule f the size of the range of f is at most
∑
i≤n |Ai|,
since f(a) = gi(b) for some i ∈ N and b ∈ Ai. This means that f∗n is non-separable.
4Using the Hamming error-correcting code [Hamming, 1950], it is in fact possible to explicitly construct f∗n for as few as n = 7 voters.
The rest of the proof remains the same.
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For most common voting rules, separable or not, it is easy to find examples where some cycles occur. Thus one
should focus on the weaker notions of convergence discussed in Section 1, which is what we do in the remainder
of the paper.
4 Order-Free Acyclicity: Plurality
Improvement steps in Plurality Recall that along a given path, at ∈ An = Cn denotes the voting profile at
time t. We denote by st = sat the score vector at time t; by cwt = fPL(at) the candidate that wins at time t; and
by swt = s¨t(cwt) the highest score at time t (including tie-breaking if it applies).
Suppose that agent i has an improvement step (a.k.a. better reply) at−1i i→ ati at time t. We classify all possible
steps into the following types (an example of such a step appears in parentheses):
Type 1. from at−1i 6= cwt−1 to ati = cwt ; (step 1 in Ex.6a.)
Type 2. from at−1i = cwt−1 to ati = cwt ; (step 1 in Ex.6b.),
Type 3. from at−1i = cwt−1 to ati 6= cwt ; (step 2 in Ex.6a.)
Note that steps of type 1 and 2 are direct, whereas type 3 steps are indirect.
4.1 Lexicographic Tie-Breaking
In this section we assume that ties are broken lexicographically. Given some score vector s, we denote by s¨(c) ∈ R
the score of c ∈ C that includes the lexicographic tie-breaking component. One way to formally define it is by
setting s¨(c) = s(c) + 1
m+1 (m − L(c)), where L(c) is the lexicographic index of candidate c. However the only
important property of s¨ is that s¨(c) > s¨(c′) if either s(c) > s(c′) or the score is equal and c has a higher priority
(lower index) than c′.
Thus for Plurality with lexicographic tie-breaking, a given weight vector w and a given initial score vector sˆ,
we denote the outcome by
fPL
sˆ,w(a) = argmaxc∈C s¨sˆ,w,a(c).
As with s, we omit the scripts w, sˆ and PL when they are clear from the context.
Lemma 4. Consider a game
〈
fPL
w,sˆ,Q
〉
. If there exists a better reply for a given agent i at state at−1, then i has
a direct best reply at state at−1.
The proof is trivial under lexicographic tie-breaking, by letting i vote for her most preferred candidate among
all better replies. In this case the direct best reply is also unique.
One implication of the lemma is that it is justified and natural to restrict our discussion to direct replies and
focus on FDRP, as w.l.o.g. a voter always has a direct reply that is at least as good as any other reply.
Unweighted Voters Suppose all voters have unit weight. We start with our main result for this section.
Theorem 5. fPL
sˆ
is FDRP. Moreover, any path of direct replies will converge after at most m2n2 steps. In
particular, Plurality is order-free acyclic.
This extends a weaker version of the theorem that appeared in the preliminary version of this paper [Meir et al.,
2010], which only showed FDBRP. The bound on the number of direct-best-reply steps was recently improved to
O(mn) in [Reyhani and Wilson, 2012, Theorem 5.4].
Proof. By our restriction to direct replies, there can only be moves of types 1 and 2. We first consider moves of
type 1, and inductively prove two invariants that yield a bound on the total number of such moves. Next, we bound
the number of moves of type 2 by a given voter between any of his moves of type 1, which completes the proof.
8
b cwt−1 a
i
s
b = cwt a
i
s
st(a)
st(b)
Figure 5: An illustration of a type 1 move. Tie-breaking is in favor of the left most candidate.
Consider time t−1 and denote the score of the current winner (including tie-breaking) by s¯ = swt−1. Suppose
that a move a i→ b of type 1 occurs at time t: that is, a 6= cwt−1 and b = cwt. We then have (see Fig. 5):
s¨t(b) = swt ≥ swt−1 = s¯ ≥ s¨t−1(a) = s¨t(a) + 1. (1)
We claim that at any later time t′ ≥ t the following two invariants hold:
I. Either there is a candidate c 6= a whose score is at least s¯ + 1, or there are at least two candidates c, c′ 6= a
whose score is at least s¯. In particular it holds in either case that swt′ ≥ s¯.
II. The score of a does not increase: s¨t′(a) ≤ s¨t(a).
Note that this, coupled with Eq. (1), implies that candidate a will never win again, as its score will stay strictly
below s¯, and there will always be a candidate with a score of at least s¯.
We now prove both invariants by induction on time t′. In the base case t′ = t, (I) holds since both cwt−1 and b
have a score of at least s¯, and (II) holds trivially.
Assume by induction that both invariants hold until time t′ − 1, and consider step t′ by voter j. Due to (I), we
either have at least two candidates whose score is at least s¯, or a candidate with a score of at least s¯ + 1. Due to
(II) and Eq. (1) we have that s¨t′(a) ≤ s¨t(a) < s¯− 1.
Let d j→ d′ be the step at time t′ by voter j (that is, d = at′−1j , d′ = at
′
j ). We first argue that d′ 6= a: by adding
the vote of j to a its score will still be strictly less than s¯, whereas by removing a vote from any other candidate d,
we still have at least one candidate c with score at least s¯. Thus a cannot be a direct reply for any voter j, and (II)
still holds after step t′.
It remains to show that (I) holds. If d is not one of the candidates in (I) with the score of at least s¯ at time t′−1,
then their score does not decrease after step t′, and we are done. Otherwise, we divide into the following cases:
1. At t′ − 1, d is the (only) candidate with a score of at least s¯+ 1.
2. At t′ − 1, candidates c, c′ have scores of at least s¯, and d is one of them (w.l.o.g. d = c).
In the first case, s¨t′(d) = s¨t−1(d) − 1 ≥ s¯ + 1 − 1 = s¯, whereas s¨t′(d′) > s¨t′(d) ≥ s¯. Thus both d, d′ have
scores of at least s¯ at time t′, as required. In the second case, since only c = d can lose votes, then if d′ 6= c′,
s¨t
′
(d′) = swt
′
≥ s¨t
′
(c′) = s¨t
′−1(c′) ≥ s¯,
and thus both c′, d′ have scores of at least s¯ at time t, as required. If d′ = c′, then and thus both c′, d′ have scores
of at least s¯ at time t, as required. If d′ = c′, then
s¨t
′
(d′) = s¨t
′−1(d′) + 1 = s¨t
′−1(c′) + 1 ≥ s¯+ 1,
that is, d′ has a score of at least s¯+ 1, as required.
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Next, we demonstrate that invariants (I) and (II) supply us with a polynomial bound on the rate of convergence.
Indeed, as we mentioned before, at every step of type 1, at least one candidate is ruled out permanently, and there
are at most n times that a vote can be withdrawn from a given candidate. Also note that, since a type 2 move by a
given voter i implies that he prefers ati to a
t−1
i , each voter can make at most m− 1 type 2 moves before making a
move of type 1. Hence, there are in total at most m2n2 steps until convergence.
Furthermore, it is easy to show that if all voters start from the truthful state then type 2 moves never occur.
Thus, the score of the winner never decreases, and the game converges in at most mn steps.
Next, we show that the restriction to direct replies is necessary to guarantee convergence, whereas a restriction
to best replies is insufficient.
Proposition 6. fPL is not FBRP, even from the truthful state. Moreover, there are: (a) a counterexample with
two strategic agents and an arbitrary initial state; (b) a counterexample with three strategic agents and a truthful
initial vote.
Remark 4.1. In this example and in others throughout the paper we use an initial score vector sˆ. However, this is
w.l.o.g. since we could replace sˆ with additional voters that do not participate in the cycle. Initial scores are only
useful to construct examples that are simpler and/or with fewer strategic agents. This holds for all negative results
in the paper.5 For positive results, we have to show convergence for every initial scores sˆ.
Example 6a. C = {a, b, c}. We have a single fixed voter voting for a, thus sˆ = (1, 0, 0). The preference profile is
defined as a ≻1 b ≻1 c, c ≻2 b ≻2 a. The following cycle consists of better replies (the vector denotes the votes
(a1, a2) at time t, the winner appears in curly brackets):
(b, c){a}
2
→ (b, b){b}
1
→ (c, b){a}
2
→ (c, c){c}
1
→ (b, c).
Note that all steps are best-replies, but the steps of agent 1 are indirect. ♦
Example 6b. C = {a, b, c, d}. Candidates a, b, and c have 2 fixed voters each, thus sˆ = (2, 2, 2, 0). We use
3 agents with the following preferences: d ≻1 a ≻1 b ≻1 c, c ≻2 b ≻2 a ≻2 d and d ≻3 a ≻3 b ≻3 c.
Starting from the truthful state (d, c, d) the agents can make the following two improvement steps, which are direct
best-replies (showing only the outcome s and the winner): (2, 2, 3, 2){c} 1→ (2, 3, 3, 1){b} 3→ (3, 3, 3, 0){a},
after which agents 1 and 2 repeat the cycle shown in (6a). ♦
Thus for the non-weighted lexicographic case Theorem 5 and Proposition 6 provide a clear-cut rule: direct
replies guarantee convergence, whereas convergence is not guaranteed under other restrictions such as best reply
or initial truthful vote. However, as the following section demonstrates, in the presence of weighted agents even
direct replies may no longer converge.
Weighted Voters Next, we show that if the voters may have non-identical weights, then convergence to equilib-
rium is not guaranteed even if they start from the truthful state and use direct best replies.
Proposition 7. There is fPLw that is not restricted-FDRP, even from the truthful state.
Example 7. The initial fixed score of candidates {a, b, c, d} is sˆ = (0, 1, 2, 3). The weight of each voter i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
is i. The preference profile is as follows: c ≻1 d ≻1 b ≻1 a, b ≻2 c ≻2 a ≻2 d, and a ≻3 b ≻3 c ≻3 d. We
omit the rest of the proof. The initial truthful profile is thus a0 = (c, b, a), which results in the score vector
s0 = (3, 3, 3, 3) where a is the winner.
votes: (c, b, a) 1→ (d, b, a) 2→ (d, c, a)
scores: (3, 3, 3, 3){a} (3, 3, 2, 4){d} (3, 1, 4, 4){c}
↑ 3 ↓ 3
(c, b, b)
2
← (c, c, b)
1
← (d, c, b)
(0, 6, 3, 3){b} (0, 4, 5, 3){c} (0, 4, 4, 4){b}
5Note that the remark does no longer hold if sˆ is used to construct a counter example for weak-FIP. However we use no such examples in
this paper.
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Our example shows a cycle of direct responses. Note that at every step there is only one direct reply available to
the agent, thus it is not possible to eliminate the cycle by further restricting the action scheduler. ♦
If there are only two weighted voters (and possibly other fixed voters), either restriction to direct reply or to a
truthful initial state is sufficient to guarantee convergence.
Theorem 8. fPL
sˆ,w is FDRP for n = 2.
Proof. Clearly, in one of the two first states, the agents vote for distinct candidates. At any later state, they must
continue voting for distinct candidates, as every step must change the winner, and the other voter is always voting
for the current winner. This means that the score of the winner strictly increases with every step (possibly except
the first one).
Theorem 9. fPL
sˆ,w is FIP from the truth for n = 2.
Proof. We show that the score of the winner can only increase. This clearly holds in the first step, which must be
of type 1. Once again, we have that the two agents always vote for different candidates, and thus only steps that
increase the score can change the identity of the winner.
Thus in either case convergence is guaranteed after at most 2m steps.
It remains an open question whether there is any restriction on better replies that guarantees order-free acyclic-
ity in weighted games, i.e. if fPLw is restricted-FIP for n > 2. However Prop. 7 shows that if such restricted
dynamic exists, it must make use of indirect replies, which is rather unnatural. We thus conjecture that such
restricted dynamics does not exist.
4.2 Arbitrary tie-breaking
Lev and Rosenschein [2012] showed that for any positional scoring rule (including Plurality), we can assign some
(deterministic) tie breaking rule, so that the resulting voting rule may contains cycles. For any positional scoring
rule fα with score vector α, denote by fLRα the same rule with the Lev-Rosenschein tie-breaking.
Proposition 10 (Theorem 1 in [Lev and Rosenschein, 2012]). fLRα is not FBRP for any α, even for n = 2, and
even from the truth. In particular, Plurality with the Lev-Rosenschein tie-breaking (fPLR) is not FBRP.
In fact, a slight modification of their example (switching a and b in voter 2’s preferences) yields the following:
Proposition 11. fPLR is not restricted-FIP, even for n = 2, and even from the truth.
4.3 Randomized tie-breaking
Compared to the previously considered deterministic rule, randomized tie-breaking has the advantage of being
neutral—no specific candidate or voter is preferred over another. Formally, the game form fPR
sˆ,w maps any state
a ∈ An to the set argmaxc∈C ssˆ,w,a(c). Since under randomized tie-breaking there are multiple winners, let
W t = fPR(at) ⊆ C denote the set of winners at time t.6 We define a direct reply at−1i
i
→ ati as one where
ati ∈ W
t
.
If ties are broken randomly, ≻i does not induce a complete order over outcomes. For instance, the order
a ≻i b ≻i c does not determine if i will prefer {b} over {a, c}. However, we can naturally extend Qi to a partial
preference order over subsets. There are several standard extensions, using the following axioms:7
K (Kelly [Kelly, 1977]): (1) (∀a ∈ X, b ∈ W,a ≻i b) ⇒ X ≻i W ; (2) (∀a ∈ X, b ∈W,a i b) ⇒ X i W ;
G (Ga¨rdenfors [Ga¨rdenfors, 1976]): (∀b ∈W,a ≻i b) ⇒ {a} ≻i ({a} ∪W ) ≻i W ;
6This is a slight abuse of the notation we introduce in the beginning, where we defined the set of possible outcomes of f to be C. Here we
allow any W ∈ 2C \ {∅} as a possible outcome.
7We thank an anonymous reviewer for the references.
11
R (Responsiveness [Roth, 1985]): a ≻i b ⇐⇒ ∀W ⊆ C \ {a, b}, ({a} ∪W ) ≻i ({b} ∪W ) .
The axioms reflect various beliefs a rational voter may have on the tie-breaking procedure: the K axiom reflects
no assumptions whatsoever; The K+G axioms are consistent with tie-breaking according to a fixed and unknown
order [Geist and Endriss, 2011]; and K+G+R axioms are consistent with random tie-breaking with equal probabil-
ities (see Lemma 15 and Prop. 20). In this section we assume all axioms hold, however our results do not depend
on these interpretations, and we do not specify the voter’s preferences in cases not covered by the above axioms.
Under strict preferences, it also holds that G entails K [Endriss, 2013]. We can also define “weak” variants G2 and
R2 for axioms G and R, by replacing all strict relations with weak ones, however as long as we restrict attention to
strict preferences over elements the weak variants are not required.
For the following lemma we only need Axiom K, i.e. it does not depend on the voter’s tie-breaking assumptions.
Lemma 12. If there exists a better-reply in fPR
sˆ,w for agent i at state at−1, then i has a direct best-reply.
Proof. Suppose there is a better reply at−1i i→ b at time t − 1. As some best reply always exists, denote by b′ an
arbitrary best reply. Let W = fRP
sˆ,w (a
t−1
−i , b
′), and let a′ be the most preferred candidate of i in W . Then we argue
that at−1i
i
→ a′ is a direct best reply of i. Since a′ is a direct reply by definition, it is left to show that a′ is a best
reply (for the lexicographic case this follows immediately from W = {a′} and fPL(at−1−i , a′) =W = {a′}).
If b′ is a direct reply then b′ = a′ and we are done. Thus assume that b′ is not a direct reply from at−1i
i
→.
Then b′ /∈ W . By voting for a′ ∈ W , we get that fRP
sˆ,w (a
t−1
−i , a
′) = {a′}, i.e., a′ remains the unique winner. If
|W | = 1 then we are done as in the lexicographic case. Otherwise we apply Axiom K2 with X = {a′}, and get
that a′ i W . That is,
fRPsˆ,w (a
t−1
−i , a
′) = {a′} i W = f
RP
sˆ,w (a
t−1
−i , b
′),
which means that a′ is also a best-reply.
With weighted votes and and random tie-breaking, there may not be any pure Nash equilibrium at all [Meir et al.,
2010]. We therefore restrict attention in the rest of this section to unweighted votes.
Proposition 13. fPR is not FIP.
Example 13. C = {a, b, c} with initial score sˆ = (0, 1, 0). The initial state is a0 = (a, a, b)—that is, s(a0) =
(2, 2, 0) and the outcome is the winner set {a, b}. The preferences are a ≻1 c ≻1 b, b ≻2 a ≻2 c and c ≻3 b ≻3 a.
We get the following cyclic sequence:
(2, 2, 0){a, b}
2
→ (1, 2, 1){b}
1
→ (0, 2, 2){b, c}
↑ 3 ↓ 3
(1, 2, 1){b}
1
← (2, 1, 1){a}
2
← (1, 1, 2){c}
We emphasize that each step is justified as a better reply by either Axiom K or Axiom G. E.g, in the step of agent 2
in the top row, agent 2 prefers b ≻2 a, and thus b ≻2 {a, b} by Axiom G. This will be used later in Section 4.4. ♦
Theorem 14. fPR
sˆ
is FBRP from the truth.
Proof. We denote the sets of winners and runnerups at time t as W t = fRP (at);Rt = {c : st(c) = swt− 1}. We
will show by induction that at any step at−1 i→ at:
1. W t ∪Rt ⊆W t−1 ∪Rt−1 (i.e., candidates not in W t ∪Rt will not be selected by any agent at a later time).
2. ati is the most preferred candidate for i in W t ∪Rt (in particular, a best reply is a direct reply).
3. at−1i ≻i ati (in the terminology of [Meir et al., 2014], this is a compromise step).
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Since each voter can make at most m− 1 compromise steps, convergence is guaranteed within nm steps.
Assume that for some t ≥ 1, all of the above holds for any t′ < t (so we prove the base case together with the
other cases). Since a0 is truthful, the first step of any voter is always a compromise move. If i had already moved
at some previous time t′ < t, then at′i is most preferred in W t
′
∪Rt
′
.
By induction, a = at−1i is the most preferred candidate in some C′ that contains W t−1 ∪ Rt−1 (C′ = C
in i’s first step, and C′ = W t′ ∪ Rt′ at any other step). Let x and y be i’s most preferred candidates in W t−1
and in Rt−1, respectively, and denote the best reply by a′ = ati. Each of a or a′ may belong to W t−1, to Rt−1,
or to neither set. This means there are 3X3=9 cases to check. Fortunately, we can show that some of this cases
immediately lead to a contradiction, and in the other cases all invariants 1-3 will hold after step t.
Consider first the case a ∈ W t−1. Since a is most preferred in C′, it is strictly more preferred than any other
candidate in W t−1 or in Rt−1 (i.e., a = x). Thus if a′ ∈ W t−1 we get W t = {a′} ≺i W t−1 by Axiom G. If
a′ ∈ Rt−1 we get W t = (W t−1 \ {a}) ∪ {a′} ≺i W t−1 by Axiom R. In either case this is not an improvement
step for voter i.
Next, suppose a /∈W t−1. We further split to subcases based on a′.
• If a′ ∈ W t−1 then f(a−i, a′) = {a′}. Then a′ = x, as otherwise f(a−i, x) = {x} ≻i {a′}, and i is
strictly better off by voting for x. This entails W t = {x}, Rt = W t−1 \ {x} so all invariants 1-3 hold: (1)
W t−1 = W t ∪ Rt; (2) follows from (1) since a′ = x is the most preferred in W t−1; and (3) follows from
(1) since a = at−1i is the most preferred in C′, and a′ ∈ C′.
• If a′ ∈ Rt−1 then f(a−i, a′) = {a′} ∪W t−1. Then a′ = y, as otherwise f(a−i, y) = {y} ∪W t−1 ≻i
{a′}∪W t−1 by Axiom R, which means i is strictly better off by voting for y. This entailsW t = {y}∪W t−1,
Rt = Rt−1 \ {y}. We also get that a′ = y ≻i x or else x would have been a strictly better reply. Thus all
invariants 1-3 hold: (1) W t = W t−1 ∪ {y} ⊆W t−1 ∪Rt−1 and Rt = Rt \ {y}; (2) follows from (1) since
a′ = ati = y is most preferred in Rt−1 and strictly preferred to x; (3) follows from (1) as in the previous
case.
• If a′ /∈ W t−1 ∪ Rt−1, then W t = f(a−i, a′) = W t−1. The outcome does not change so this cannot be an
improvement step for i.
Cardinal utilities A (cardinal) utility function is a mapping of candidates to real numbers u : C → R, where
ui(c) ∈ R is the utility of candidate c to agent i. We say that u is consistent with a preference relation Qi if
u(c) > u(c′) ⇔ c ≻i c′. The definition of cardinal utility naturally extends to multiple winners by setting
ui(W ) =
1
|W |
∑
c∈W ui(c) for any subset W ⊆ C.8
Lemma 15. Consider any cardinal utility function u and the partial preference order Q it induces on subsets by
random tie-breaking. Q holds Axioms K+G+R.
The proof is rather straight-forward, and is deferred to the appendix.
Proposition 16. fPR is not FIP from the truth.
Example 16. We use 5 candidates with initial score sˆ = (1, 1, 2, 0, 0), and 2 agents with utilities u1 = (5, 3, 2, 8, 0)
and u2 = (4, 2, 5, 0, 8). In particular, {b, c} ≻1 c, {a, c} ≻1 {a, b, c}, and {a, b, c} ≻2 {b, c}, c ≻2 {a, c}, and the
following cycle occurs: (1, 1, 2, 1, 1){c} 1→ (1, 2, 2, 0, 1){b, c} 2→ (2, 2, 2, 0, 0){a, b, c} 1→ (2, 1, 2, 1, 0){a, c} 2→
(1, 1, 2, 1, 1){c}. ♦
Finally, in contrast to the lexicographic case, convergence is no longer guaranteed if agents start from an
arbitrary profile of votes, or are allowed to use direct-replies that are not best-replies. The following example
shows that in the randomized tie-breaking setting even direct best reply dynamics may have cycles, albeit for
specific utility scales.
8One interpretation is that we randomize the final winner from the set W , and hence the term randomized tie-breaking. For a thorough
discussion of cardinal and ordinal utilities in normal form games, see [Borgers, 1993].
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Proposition 17. fPR is not restricted-FIP.
Example 17. There are 4 candidates {a, b, c, x} and 3 agents with utilities u1 = (7, 3, 0, 4), u2 = (0, 7, 3, 4)
and u3 = (3, 0, 7, 4). In particular, the following preference relations hold: a ≻1 {a, b} ≻1 x ≻1 {a, c};
b ≻2 {b, c} ≻2 x ≻2 {a, b}; and c ≻3 {a, c} ≻3 x ≻3 {b, c}.
Consider the initial state a0 = (a, b, x) with s(a0) = (1, 1, 0, 1) and the outcome {a, b, x}. We have the
following cycle where every step is the unique reply of the playing agent.
(1, 1, 0, 1){a, b, x}
2
→ (1, 0, 0, 2){x}
3
→ (1, 0, 1, 1){a, x, c}
↑ 1 ↓ 1
(0, 1, 0, 2){x}
3
← (0, 1, 1, 1){x, b, c}
2
← (0, 0, 1, 2){x}
♦
Proposition 18. fPR is not FDRP even from the truth.
Example 18. We take the game from Ex. 17, and add for each voter i ∈ {1, 2, 3} a candidate di, s.t. ui(di) =
8, ui(dj) = j for j 6= i. We also add an initial score of 3 to each of the candidates {a, b, c, x}. Voter 3 moves first
to a13 = x, which is a direct reply. Then voters 1 and 2 move to their best replies a, b, respectively. Now the cycle
continues as in Ex. 17. ♦
4.4 Stochastic Dominance and Local Dominance
While assigning cardinal utilities is one way to deal with ties, it is sometimes preferable not to assume a particular
cardinal utility scale. Denote by fP (a) ⊆ C the subset of candidates with maximal Plurality score, before any tie-
breaking takes place. We can still derive a well-defined dynamics from any partial order over subsets of candidates,
by assuming that a voter performs a better-response step if she strictly prefer the new outcome, and otherwise (if
the new outcome is same, worse, or incomparable) she does not move.
One example of such a partial order is stochastic dominance (SD), which was applied to tie-breaking by
[Reyhani and Wilson, 2012]. A different partial order is implied by local dominance (LD) which was defined for
voting with uncertainty about the outcome [Conitzer et al., 2011; Meir et al., 2014], when uncertainty is regarding
the tie breaking. We show how convergence results for LD/SD dynamics fit with other results.
Stochastic dominance Reyhani and Wilson assume that ties are broken uniformly at random, and that a voter
will only perform a step that stochastically dominates the current winner(s), if such exists.
Theorem 19 (Theorem 5.7 in [Reyhani and Wilson, 2012]). Plurality with stochastic dominance tie-breaking is
FDBRP.
We can show the following (see appendix):
Proposition 20. A step a i→ a′ is a better-response under random tie-breaking and stochastic dominance, if and
only if fP (a′) ≻i fP (a) is entailed by Qi, Axioms K+G+R, and transitivity.
In other words, while Theorem 14 allowed any moves consistent with the axioms, SD allows only moves that
follow from the axioms, and explicitly forbid any other step. Thus it is more restricted than expected-utility based
randomized tie-breaking.
Since any SD step is also a better-reply under any cardinal utility scale, any strong or restricted convergence
result for the latter applies to the former, but not vice-versa.
14
Local dominance Suppose that there are several candidates with maximal score. A voter may consider all of
them as “perhaps winners,” without specifying how the actual winner is selected. If the voter is concerned about
making a move that will leave her worse off, she will only make moves that will improve her utility with certainty,
i.e. that dominates her current action (where possible worlds are all strict tie-breaking orders) [Conitzer et al.,
2011; Meir et al., 2014; Meir, 2015].9
Theorem 21 (Theorem 11 in the full version of [Meir, 2015]). Plurality with Local-Dominance tie-breaking is
FDRP.
To see how this compares with other convergence results, we need the following proposition (see appendix).
Proposition 22. A step a i→ a′ is a better-response under unknown tie-breaking and local dominance, if and only
if fP (a′) ≻i fP (a) is entailed by Qi, Axioms K+G, and transitivity.
Note that since Axioms K+G+R include K+G, any LD step is also an SD step, so a restriction to LD can only
eliminate cycles. Thus FBDRP follows from Theorem 19. We note that with either SD or LD tie-breaking there
may be new stable states that are not Nash-equilibria. Even so, an analysis of Ex. 13 shows that all steps are
entailed by Axioms K+G (and thus by Axioms K+G+R). Thus neither game form is FIP.
What if we assume that voters are even more risk-averse and only follow steps that are better-replies by Ax-
iom K? Then it is easy to see that only moves to a more-preferred candidate can be better-replies (any move to or
from a tie cannot follow from Axiom K and is thus forbidden), which means there are trivially no cycles.
5 Weak Acyclicity
Except for Plurality and Veto, convergence is not guaranteed even under restrictions on the action scheduler and the
initial state. In contrast, simulations [Grandi et al., 2013; Meir et al., 2014; Koolyk et al., 2016] show that iterative
voting almost always converges even when this is not guaranteed by theory. We believe that weak acyclicity is an
important part of the explanation to this gap.
5.1 Plurality with Random tie-breaking
We have seen in Section 4 that while fPR is FDRP from the truthful initial state, this is no longer true from
arbitrary states, and in fact fPR is not restricted-FIP under any action scheduler. Our main theorem in this section
shows that under a certain scheduler (of agents+actions), convergence is guaranteed from any state. Further, this
still holds if actions are restricted to direct-replies.
Lemma 23. Consider any game G =
〈
fPR
sˆ
,Q
〉
. Consider some candidate a∗, and suppose that in a0, there are
x, y s.t. s0(x) ≥ s0(y) ≥ s0(a∗) + 2. Then for any sequence of direct replies, a∗ /∈ f(at).
Proof. We show that at any time t ≥ 0 there are xt, yt s.t. s0(x), s0(y) ≥ s0(a∗) + 2. For t = 0 this holds for
xt = x, yt = y. Assume by induction that the premise holds for at−1. Then there are two cases:
1. |f(at−1)| ≥ 2. Then since step t must be a direct reply, it must be to some candidate z with st−1(z) ≥
swt−1 − 1. Also, either xt−1 or yt−1 did not lose votes (w.l.o.g. xt−1). Thus st(x), st(z) ≥ swt−1 ≥
st−1(a∗) + 2 ≥ st(a∗) + 2.
2. |f(at−1)| = 1. Then suppose f(at−1) = {xt−1}, and we have that swt−1 ≥ st−1(a∗) + 3. The next step is
z where either st−1(z) = swt−1− 1 (and then we conclude as in case 1), or st−1(z) = swt−1− 2 and xt−1
loses 1 vote. In the latter case, st(xt−1) = st(z) = swt−1 − 1 ≥ st−1(a∗) + 2 ≥ st(a∗) + 2.
Theorem 24. fPR
sˆ
is weak-FDRP.
9[Meir et al., 2014; Meir, 2015] consider more general uncertainty over candidates’ score, and [Conitzer et al., 2011] considers arbitrary
information sets.
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Proof. Consider a game G = 〈fPR
sˆ
,Q
〉
, and an initial state a0. For a state a, denote by B(a) ⊆ An all states
reachable from a via paths of direct replies. Let B = B(a0), and assume towards a contradiction that B does not
contain a Nash equilibrium. For every b ∈ B, let C(b) = {c ∈ C : ∃a ∈ B(b) ∧ c ∈ f(a)}, i.e. all candidates
that are winners in some state reachable from b.
For any b ∈ B(a0), define a game Gb by taking G and eliminating all candidates not in C(b). Since we only
consider direct replies, for any a ∈ B(b), the set of outgoing edges I(a) is the same in G and in Gb (as any direct
reply must be to candidate in C(b)). Thus by our assumption, the set B(b) in game Gb does not contain an NE.
For any b ∈ B(a0), let b∗ be the truthful state of game Gb, and let T (b) ⊆ N be the set of agents who are
truthful in b. That is, i ∈ T (b) if bi = b∗i .
Let b0 be some state b ∈ B(a0) s.t. |T (b)| is maximal, and let T 0 = T (b0). If |T 0| = n then b0 is the truthful
state of Gb0 , and thus by Theorem 14 all best-reply paths from b0 in Gb0 lead to an NE, in contradiction to B(b0)
not containing any NE. Thus T 0 < n. We will prove that there is a path from b0 to a state b′ s.t. |T (b′)| > |T 0|.
Let i /∈ T (b0) (must exist by the previous paragraph). Consider the score of candidate b∗i at state b0. We
divide into 5 cases. All scores specified below are in the game Gb0 .
Case 1. |f(b0)| > 1 and b∗i ∈ f(b0) (i.e b∗i is one of several winners). Then consider the step b0 i→ b∗i . This
make b∗i the unique winner, and thus it is a direct best-reply for i. In the new state b′ = (b0−i, b∗i ) we have
T (b′) = T (b0) ∪ {i}.
Case 2. s0(b∗i ) = sw0 − 1 (i.e., b∗i needs one more vote to become a winner). By Axioms G+R, i prefers f(b0−i, b∗i )
over f(b0). Then similarly to case 1, i has a direct step b0 i→ b∗i , which results in a “more truthful” state b′.
Case 3. b∗i = f(b0) (i.e b∗i is the unique winner). Then the next step b0 j→ b1 will bring us to one of the two
previous cases. Moreover, it must hold that j /∈ T (b0) since otherwise b0j = b∗j = f(b0) which means
Ij(b
0) = ∅. Thus |T (b′)| = |T (b1)|+ 1 ≥ |T (b0)|+ 1.
Case 4. f(b0) = x 6= b∗i , and s0(x) = s0(b∗i ) + 2. We further divide into:
Case 4.1. s0(b∗i ) ≥ s0(y) for all y 6= x. Then the next step by j must be from x, which brings us to one of the
two first cases (as in Case 3).
Case 4.2. There is y 6= x s.t. s0(x) = s0(y) + 1 = s0(b∗i ) + 2. Then we continue the sequence of steps until
the winner’s score decreases. Since all steps that maintain swt select a more preferred candidate, this
most occur at some time t, and T (b0) ⊆ T (bt). Then at bt we are again in Case 1 or 2.
Case 4.3. There is y 6= x s.t. s0(x) = s0(y) = s0(b∗i ) + 2. Then by Lemma 23 b∗i can never be selected, in
contradiction to b∗i ∈ C(b0).
Case 5. f(b0) = x 6= b∗i , and s0(x) ≥ s0(b∗i ) + 3. We further divide into:
Case 5.1. For all y 6= x, s0(y) ≤ s0(x)− 3. In this case no reply is possible.
Case 5.2. There is some y 6= x s.t. s0(y) ≥ s0(b∗i ) + 2. Then by Lemma 23 b∗i can never be selected, in
contradiction to b∗i ∈ C(b0).
Case 5.3. There is some y 6= x s.t. s0(y) ≥ s0(b∗i ) + 1 Then the next step must be from x to such y. Which
means s1(x) = s1(y) = sw0 − 1 ≥ s0(b∗i ) + 2 = s
1(b∗i ) + 2. Thus again by Lemma 23 we reach a
contradiction.
Therefore we either construct a path of direct replies to b′ ∈ B(b0) with |T (b′)| > |T (b0)| in contradiction to
our maximality assumption, or we reach another contradiction. Thus B(b0) must contain some NE (both in Gb0
and in G), which means by construction that G is weakly-FDRP from b0. However since b0 ∈ B(a0), we get that
G is weakly-FDRP from a0 as well.
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Remark 5.1. Theorem 24 and Ex. 17 provide a partial answer to an open question regarding whether there are
game forms that admit weak FIP but not restricted FIP [Kukushkin, 2011]. Indeed, the game form fPR for
m = 4, n = 3 is such an example, but one that uses randomization. However if we think of fPR as a deterministic
game form with 2m− 1 possible outcomes (all nonempty subsets of candidates), where players are restricted to m
actions each, then the allowed utility profiles are constrained (by Axioms G and R) and thus this result does not
settle Kukushkin’s question completely.
5.2 Weighted Plurality
When voters are weighted, cycles of direct responses can emerge [Meir et al., 2010; Meir, 2016]. We conjecture
that such cycles must depend on the order of agents, and that certain orders will break such cycles and reach an
equilibrium, at least from the truthful state.
Conjecture 25. fPL
sˆ,w is weak-FDRP (in particular weak-FIP).
Similar techniques to those used so far appear to be insufficient to prove the conjecture. For example, in
contrast to the unweighted case, a voter might return to a candidate she deserted in any scheduler, even if only two
weight levels are present. We thus leave the proof of the general conjecture for future work.
Yet, we want to demonstrate the power of weak acyclicity over restricted acyclicity, even when there are
no randomness or restrictions on the utility space. That is, to provide a definite (negative) answer to Kukushkin’s
question of whether weak acyclicity entails restricted acyclicity. To do so, we will use a slight variation of Plurality
with weighted voters and lexicographic tie-breaking.
Theorem 26. There exist a game form f∗ s.t. f∗ is weak-FIP but not restricted-FIP.
Proof. Consider the following game G: The initial fixed score of candidates {a, b, c, d} is sˆ = (0, 1, 2, 3). The
weight of each voter i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is i. The preference profile is as follows: c ≻1 d ≻1 b ≻1 a, b ≻2 c ≻2 a ≻2 d,
and a ≻3 b ≻3 c ≻3 d. This game was used in [Meir et al., 2010] to demonstrate that Plurality with weighted
voters is not FDRP, however it can be verified that G is restricted-FIP so it is not good enough for our use.
If we ignore agents’ preferences, we get a particular game form fPL
sˆ,w where N = {1, 2, 3}, M = {a, b, c, d},
sˆ = (0, 1, 2, 3) and w = (1, 2, 3).
We define f∗ by modifying fPL
sˆ,w with the following restrictions on agents’ actions: A1 = {c, d}, A2 =
{b, c}, A3 = {a, b, d}. Thus f∗ is a 2× 2× 3 game form, presented in Figure 6(a).
We first show that f∗ is not restricted-FIP. Indeed, consider the game G∗ accepted from f∗ with the same
preferences from game G (Figure 6(b)). We can see that there is a cycle of length 6 (in bold). An agent scheduler
that always selects the agent with the bold reply guarantees that convergence does not occur, since in all 6 relevant
states the selected agent has no alternative replies.
Next, we show that f∗ is weak-FIP. That is, for any preference profile there is some scheduler that guarantees
convergence. We thus divide into cases according to the preferences of agent 3. In each case, we specify a state
where the scheduler selects agent 3, the action of the agent, and the new state.
We note that since all thick edges must be oriented in the same direction, a ≻3 b if and only if b ≻3 c. Thus
the following three cases are exhaustive.
Q3 state action new state
1 b ≻ d (d, b, a) b (d, b, b)
2 d ≻ b & d ≻ a (c, b, b) d (c, b, d)
3 a ≻ d ≻ b ≻ c (d, c, b) d (d, c, d)
In either case, agent 3 moves from a state on the cycle to a Nash equilibrium.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
The main conceptual contribution of this work was to provide a joint rigorous framework for the study of iterative
voting, as part of the broader literature on acyclicity of games and game forms.
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(a) The game form f∗
(c c d){d}
(c c b){c}
(c c a){c}
(d c d){d}
(d c b){b}
(d c a){c}
(c b d){d}
(c b b){b}
(c b a){a}
(d b d){d}
(d b b){b}
(d b a){d}
3 3
3
3
3
3
3
1
1
2 2 2
3
3
(b) The game G∗
(c c d){d}
(c c b){c}
(c c a){c}
(d c d){d}
(d c b){b}
(d c a){c}
(c b d){d}
(c b b){b}
(c b a){a}
(d b d){d}
(d b b){b}
(d b a){d}
Figure 6: In each state we specify the actions of all 3 agents, and the outcome in curly brackets. Agent 1 controls
the horizontal axis, agent 2 the vertical axis, and agent 3 the in/out axis. We omit edges between states with
identical outcomes, since such moves are impossible for any transitive preferences. A directed edge in (b) is a
better-reply in G∗.
On the technical level, this unified presentation enabled us to construct examples of voting rules that settle at
two open questions on acyclicity of game forms: first, showing that there may be non-separable game forms that
are FIP (Theorem 3); and second, that there are game forms that are weakly acyclic but not order-free acyclic
(Theorem 26).
In addition, we provide an extensive study of convergence properties of the common Plurality rule and its
variations. We summarize all known results on iterative voting that we are aware of in Table 1. Note that in
some cases we get positive results if we restrict the initial state or the number of voters (not shown in the table).
For Plurality we provide a more detailed picture in Figs. 7,8. Previous papers whose results are covered in the
Table 1 often use different terminology and thus theorems and examples need to be rephrased (and sometimes
slightly modified) to be directly comparable. These rephrasing and necessary modifications are explained in detail
in [Meir, 2016]. The only paper not covered in [Meir, 2016] is by Koolyk et al. [2016], which provided non-
convergence examples for a variety of common voting rules including Maximin, Copeland, Bucklin, STV, Second-
Order Copeland, and Ranked Pairs. All results demonstrate cycles under best-reply (and under several other
restrictions) from the truthful state, thereby proving that neither of these rules is FBRP (even from the truth).
Beyond the direct implication of various acyclicity properties on convergence in an interactive setting where
agents vote one-by-one, [strong/weak] acyclicity is tightly linked to the convergence properties of more sophis-
ticated learning strategies in repeated games [Bowling, 2005; Marden et al., 2007], which is another reason to
understand them.
Fabrikant et al. [2010] provide a sufficient condition for weak-acyclicity, namely that any subgame contains
a unique Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, this criterion is not very useful for most voting rules, where typically
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Voting rule FIP FBRP FDBRP restricted-FIP Weak-FIP
Dictator V V - V V
Plurality (lex.) X X (Ex. 6) V (Thm. 5) V V
Plurality (LD) X (Ex. 13) ? V [M15] V V
Plurality (SD) X (Ex. 13) ? V [RW12] V V
Plurality (rand.) X (Ex. 13) X X X (Ex. 17) V (Thm. 24)
Weighted Plurality (lex.) X X X (Ex. 7) ? ?
Veto X X [M16] V [RW12,LR12] V V
k-approval (k ≥ 2) X X [LR12,L15] - X X [M16]
Borda X X [RW12,LR12] - X X [RW12]
PSRs (except k-approval) X X [LR12,L15] - ? ?
Approval X X [M16] - V [M16] V
Other common rules X X [KLR16] - ? ?
Table 1: Positive results carry to the right side, negative to the left side. We assume lexicographic tie
breaking in all rules except Plurality. FDBRP is only well-defined for Plurality and Veto. Reference codes:
RW12 [Reyhani and Wilson, 2012], LR12 [Lev and Rosenschein, 2012], M15 [Meir, 2015], L15 [Lev, 2015],
M16 [Meir, 2016], KLR16 [Koolyk et al., 2016].
FBRP (Ex. 6) restricted-FBRP ⇒ weak-FBRP
⇑ ⇓ ⇓
FIP restricted-FIP ⇒ weak-FIP
⇓ ⇑ ⇑
FDRP (Thm. 5) ⇛ FDBRP ⇛ restricted-FDRP ⇒ weak-FDRP
Figure 7: Convergence results for Plurality under lexicographic tie-breaking. Positive results (in light green) carry
with the direction of the arrows, whereas negative results (dark gray) carry in the opposite direction.
(at least) all unanimous votes form equilibria. Another sufficient condition due to Apt and Simon [2012] is by
eliminating never-best-reply strategies, and the prospects of applying it to common voting rules is not yet clear.
We can see that in the “standard” lexicographic domain, convergence is guaranteed from any initial state
provided that voters restrict themselves to direct replies. With randomized tie-breaking, we must also require
a truthful initial vote. On the other hand, we can also allow indirect best-replies, so the results are essentially
incomparable. However, we see the result in the lexicographic case as stronger, since it only requires a very mild
and natural behavioral restriction in the context of Plurality voting, whereas it is harder to justify assumptions on
the initial state.
Implications on social choice Importantly, best-reply dynamics is a natural and straightforward process, and
requires little information. As such, and due to the convergence properties demonstrated in this work, it is an
attractive “baseline” candidate for predicting human voter behavior in elections and designing artificial agents
with strategic voting capabilities—two of the most important, and also the hardest, goals of social choice research.
However, the clear disadvantage of this approach is that in the vast majority of cases (especially when there
are more than a handful of voters), almost every voting profile (including the truthful one) is already a Nash
equilibrium. Given this, our analysis is particularly suitable when the number of voters is small, for two main
reasons. First, it is more practical to perform an iterative voting procedure with few participants. Second, the
question of convergence is only relevant when cases of tie or near-tie are common. In more complex situations
with many active voters who may change their vote, it is likely that a more elaborate game-theoretic model is
required, which takes into account voters’ uncertainty and heuristic behavior (see Section 1.1).
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FBRP from truth (Thm. 14) ⇐ FBRP restricted-FBRP ⇒ weak-FBRP ?
⇑ ⇑ ⇓ ⇓
FIP from truth ⇐ FIP ⇛ restricted-FIP (Ex. 17) ⇒ weak-FIP
⇓ ⇓ ⇑ ⇑
FDRP from truth (Ex. 18) ⇐ FDRP restricted-FDRP ⇒ weak-FDRP (Thm. 24)
Figure 8: Convergence results for Plurality under random tie-breaking.
Promising future directions Based on the progress made in this paper and the other results published since the
introduction of iterative voting in [Meir et al., 2010], we believe that research in this area should focus on three
primary directions:
1. Weak-acyclicity seems more indicative than order-free acyclicity to determine convergence in practice. Thus
theorists should study which voting rules are weak-FIP, perhaps under reasonable restrictions (as we demon-
strated, this property is distinct from restricted-FIP). We highlight that even in rules where there are counter
examples for weak acyclicity (k-approval, Borda), these examples use two voters and games with more
voters may well be weakly acyclic.
2. It is important to experimentally study how people really vote in iterative settings (both in and out of the
lab), so that this behavior can be formalized and behavioral models can be improved. The work of [Tal et al.,
2015] is a preliminary step in this direction, but there is much more to learn. Ideally, we would like to
identify a few types of voters, such that for each type we can relatively accurately predict the next action in a
particular state. It would be even better if these types are not specific to a particular voting rule or contextual
details.
3. We would like to know not only if a voting rule converges under a particular dynamics (always or often), but
also what are the properties of the attained outcome—in particular, whether the iterative process improves
welfare or fairness, avoids “voting paradoxes” [Xia et al., 2007] and so on. Towards this end, several re-
searchers (e.g., [Reijngoud and Endriss, 2012; Braˆnzei et al., 2013; Meir et al., 2014; Bowman et al., 2014;
Koolyk et al., 2016]) have started to explore these questions via theory and simulations. However, a good un-
derstanding of how iterative voting shapes the outcome, whether the population of voters consists of humans
or artificial agents, is still under way.
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A Proofs
Lemma 15. Consider any cardinal utility function u and the partial preference order Q it induces on subsets by
random tie-breaking. Q holds Axioms K+G+R.
Proof. Let u be any utility scale, we will show that all axioms hold. Let a, b ∈ C and W ⊆ C \ {a, b}.
u({a} ∪W ) =
1
|W |+ 1|
(
u(a) +
∑
c∈W
u(c)
)
, u({b} ∪W ) =
1
|W |+ 1|
(
u(b) +
∑
c∈W
u(c)
)
= u({b} ∪W ),
thus {a} ∪W ≻Q {b} ∪W , and Axiom R holds.
Let a ∈ C,W ⊆ C s.t. ∀b ∈ W,a ≻b. Then
u(a) =
1
|W |+ 1
(
u(a) +
∑
b∈W
u(a)
)
>
1
|W |+ 1
(
u(a) +
∑
b∈W
u(b)
)
= u({a} ∪W )
>
1
|W |+ 1
(
u(W ) +
∑
b∈W
u(a)
)
=
1
|W |+ 1
u(W ) +
|W |
|W |+ 1
u(W ) = u(W ),
thus a ≻Q {a} ∪W ≻Q W and Axiom G holds.
Axiom K1 follows immediately from G. K2 also follows if preferences are strict. Even if there are ties, and
a  w for all a ∈ A,w ∈W then:
u(A) ≥ min
a∈A
u(a) ≥ max
w∈W
u(w) ≥ u(W ),
i.e., A Q W .
Definition A.1. Suppose that X,Y ⊆ C, k = |X | ≤ |Y | = K . Sort X,Y in increasing order by Q. Let
rj =
⌈
j
k
K
⌉
. Partition Y into sets Y1, . . . , Yk s.t. for j < K , Yj = {yrj−1+1, . . . , yrj} (e.g., if k = 3,K = 7, then
Y is partitioned into Y1 = {y1, y2, y3}, Y2 = {y4, y5}, Y3 = {y6, y7}).
X match-dominates Y according to Q if:
• (I) ∀j ≤ k∀y ∈ Yj , xj  y; and
• either (IIa) at least one relation is strict, or (IIb) K mod k 6= 0.
If |X | > |Y |, then X match-dominates Y if Y match-dominates X according to the reverse of Q.
Intuitively, match-domination means that for any q ∈ [0, 1], there is a fraction q of the set X that dominates a
fraction of 1− q from the set Y : at least one x ∈ X dominates all of Y , at least 20% of X dominate at least 80%
of Y , and so on.
Lemma 27. Let a, a′ be two profiles that differ by a single vote, and define X = f(a), Y = f(a′).10
The following conditions are equivalent for any strict order Q over C:
1. X stochastically dominates Y under preferences Q and uniform lottery.
2. The relation X ≻ Y is entailed by Q and the Axioms K+G+R and transitivity.
3. u(X) > u(Y ) for every u that is consistent with Q.
4. X match-dominates Y according to Q.
10Without some restriction on X, Y , the lemma is incorrect. E.g. if x1 ≻ y1 ≻ y2 ≻ x2 ≻ y3 ≻ y4, then X stochastically dominates Y
but there is no way to derive X ≻ Y from the axioms K+G+R.
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Proof. The equivalence of (1) and (3) is immediate, and used e.g. in [Reyhani and Wilson, 2012].
(2)⇒ (3). IfX ≻ Y follows from the axioms, then there is a sequence of setsX = X0 ≻ X1 ≻ · · · ≻ Xk = Y
such that each Xj ≻ Xj+1 follows from a single axiom K,G, or R. Thus it is sufficient to show for X ≻ Y that
follows from a single axiom.
If X ≻ Y follows from Axiom R, then X = {a} ∪W,Y = {b} ∪W for some W ⊆ C \ {a, b} and a ≻ b.
Thus
u(X) = u({a}∪W ) =
1
|W |+ 1|
(
u(a) +
∑
c∈W
u(c)
)
>
1
|W |+ 1|
(
u(b) +
∑
c∈W
u(c)
)
= u({b}∪W ) = u(Y ).
If X ≻ Y follows from Axiom G, then either X = Y ∪ {a} and a ≻ b for all b ∈ Y , or X = {x} and
Y = {x} ∪W where x ≻ w for all w ∈ W . For the first case
u(X) =
1
|Y |+ 1|
u(a) +
1
|Y |+ 1
∑
y∈Y
u(y) =
1
|Y |+ 1
1
|Y |
∑
y∈Y
u(a) +
1
|Y |+ 1
∑
y∈Y
u(y)
>
1
|Y |+ 1|
1
|Y |
∑
y∈Y
u(y) +
1
|Y |+ 1|
∑
y∈Y
u(y)
=
(
1 +
1
|Y |
)
1
|Y |+ 1
∑
y∈Y
u(y) =
1
|Y |
∑
y∈Y
u(y) = u(Y ).
For the second case,
u(X) = u(x) =
1
|Y |
∑
y∈Y
u(x) =
1
|Y |
(
u(x) +
∑
w∈W
u(x)
)
>
1
|Y |
(
u(x) +
∑
w∈W
u(w)
)
= u(Y ).
If X ≻ Y follows from Axiom K, then u(x) > u(y) for any x ∈ X, y ∈ Y which is a trivial case.
(3) ⇒ (4). Suppose that u(X) > u(Y ) for all u. Suppose first |X | ≤ |Y |. If |X | does not match-dominate
Y then either (I) there is an element xj′ that is less preferred than some element y′ ∈ Yj′ ; or (II) for all j and all
y ∈ Yj , xj =Q y and |Yj | = Kk = q for all j. We will derive a contradiction to (3) in either case. In the latter case,
we have u(xj) = u(Yj) for all j and thus
u(Y ) =
1
K

∑
j≤k
|Yj |u(Yj)

 =
∑
j≤k qu(xj)
K
=
∑
j≤k qu(xj)
kq
= u(X),
In contradiction to (3).
Thus we are left with case (I). That is, there are j′ ≤ k and y′ ∈ Yj′ s.t. xj′ ≺ y′. We define the (possibly
empty) set X ′ ⊆ X as all elements {x : x ≻ xj′}. We define Y ′ ⊆ Y as {y : y  y′}. By construction, for any
j > j′, Yj ⊆ Y ′. Thus
|Y ′| ≥ 1+
k∑
j=j′+1
|Yj | = 1+
k∑
j=j′+1
(rj − rj−1) = (K− rj′ )+1 = (K−
⌈
j′
k
K
⌉
)+1 > K−
j′
k
K = K(1−
j′
k
),
whereas |X ′| ≤ k − j′. We define u as follows: u(x) = 1, u(y) = 1 for all x ∈ X ′, y ∈ Y , and u(z) = 0 for
all other elements. Note that X ′, Y ′ contain the top elements of X,Y , respectively. In addition, y′ is the minimal
element in Y ′ and by transitivity y′ ≻ x for all x ∈ X \X ′. Thus u is consistent with Q.
We argue that u(Y ) > u(X) in contradiction to (3). Indeed, u(X) = |X′||X| ≤ k−j
′
k
= 1− j
′
k
.
u(Y ) =
|Y ′|
|Y |
>
(1− j
′
k
)K
K
= 1−
j′
k
=
k − j′
k
≥
|X ′|
|X |
= u(X),
so we get a contradiction to (3) again. Thus X matching-dominate Y .
(4) ⇒ (2). This is the only part of the proof where we use the profiles from which X,Y are obtained. When
a single voter moves, either the winner set changes by a single candidate (added, removed, or swapped), or X is a
single candidate, or Y is a single candidate. We prove case by case.
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• The case where |X | = |Y | = 1 is immediate.
• Suppose |X | = 1 (i.e. X = {x}) and |Y | = K > 1. Then X match-dominates Y means that x 
y for all y ∈ Y , with at least one relation being strict, w.l.o.g. yK (least preferred in Y ). Then X 
{y1, . . . , yK−1} ≻ Y , where the first transition is by Axiom K2 and the second is by Axiom G.
• The case of |Y | = 1 is symmetric.
• Suppose |X | = |Y | = k. Then X match-dominates Y means that xi  yi for all i. For all t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k},
let Xt = {x1, . . . , xt, yt+1, . . . , yk}. Then Xt−1 = Xt if xt = yt, and Xt−1 ≻ Xt otherwise from
Axiom R. In addition, X = X0, Y = Xk thus X ≻ Y from transitivity.
• Suppose |X | = k, |Y | = k + 1. Then X match-dominates Y means that |Y1| =
⌈
k+1
k
⌉
= 2, and all other
sets Yj are singletons Yj = yj . Consider the set Y ′ that includes the top k elements of Y . Since x1 is
(weakly) preferred to both candidates in Y1, Y ′ is match-dominated by X . By the previous bullet X  Y ′
follows from Axiom R and transitivity. Finally, Y ′ ≻ Y = Y ′ ∪ {minY } by Axiom G.
The following is an immediate corollary:
Proposition 20. A step a i→ a′ is a better-response under random tie-breaking and stochastic dominance, if and
only if f(a′) ≻i f(a) is entailed by Qi, the Axioms K+G+R, and transitivity.
Proposition 22. A step a i→ a′ is a better-response under unknown tie-breaking and local dominance, if and only
if f(a′) ≻i f(a) is entailed by Qi, Axioms K+G, and transitivity.
Proof. Suppose that X = f(a′) locally-dominates Y = f(a). Let Z = X ∩ Y , and X ′ = X \ Z , Y ′ = Y \ Z .
We must have x ≻i y for any x ∈ X, y ∈ Y ′, otherwise, a tie-breaking order that selects y first and x second
would make i strictly lose when moving from Y to X . Similarly, x ≻i y for any x ∈ X ′, y ∈ Y . If Z = ∅ then
X = X ′ ≻i Y ′ = Y follows from Axiom K. Otherwise, by repeatedly applying Axiom G we get X i Z i Y
with at least one relation being strict.
In the other direction, since Axiom G can only be used to add elements lower (or higher) than all existing
elements, it may only induce relations of the form Z ≻ Z ∪ Y ′ where z ≻ y for all z ∈ Z, y ∈ Y ′; or relations of
the form Z ∪X ′ ≻ Z where x ≻ z for all z ∈ Z, x ∈ X ′. Thus if X ≻ Y follows from Axiom G, they must have
the form X = Z ∪X ′, Y = Z ∪ Y ′ where x ≻ z ≻ y for all x ∈ X ′, z ∈ Z, y ∈ Y ′. To see that this entails local
dominance, let xL = L(X) be the first element in X according to order L ∈ pi(C), and likewise for Y . For any L,
xL  yL (with equality iff L(X) = L(Y ) ∈ Z). Further, either X ′ or Y ′ are non-empty (w.l.o.g. X ′). Consider
an order L′ such that L′(X) ∈ X ′, then xL′ ≻ y for all y ∈ Y and in particular xL′ ≻ yL′ .
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